The chapter begins with a restating of the fundamental circularity of cognitive science and human experience.
It then goes into the problem of Nihilism in contemporary Western culture. Nihilism is rooted in (and is a response to) objectivism. When the grasping mind comes to realization of groundlessness, it can in reaction try to turn that lack into a ground itself, or a positive presence of "the abyss". However, given the need for planetary thinking, this is not a viable course. The authors suggest an alternative in the metaphor of "laying down a path in walking".
The philosophy of Nishitani Keiji is introduced. Keiji describes the "field of consciousness" - referring to the objective/subjective model. When we see the ultimate futility of this view, we come into uncertainty - described as "the Great Doubt" in Zen tradition. This leads us to the "field of nihility" - a negative groundlessness (distinguished from Sunyata, or "emptiness").
Nietzche began to deal with this by recognizing the "collapse of fixed reference points", and suggesting that this could be overcome through his notion of the will to power. Nishitani criticizes this view, as will is still dependent on the grasping mind that gave rise to subjectivism/objectivism in the first place. His view is that the Western philosophers recognized the problem but didn't go far enough in the solution. Since our current culture is scientific, science as well must adopt the idea of groundlessness. The authors propose to do this with their enactive research program.
Traditional Western sociology is also dependent on these ideas of subject/object. Specifically, an example is given of Hobbes' despot, or the unrestrained economic man. Planetary thinking requires an embodiment of concern for others. Buddhist tradition describes how emptiness is "filled with compassion" - a positive to Buddhist thinking often unmentioned in the west. As mindfulness/awareness arises, the individual realizes "compassionate action" as an already-present "skill". Normative societal rules should be "informed by the wisdom that enables them to be dissolved in the demands of reponsivity to the particularity and immediacy of lived situations" (p 252), and "sustained, disciplined practice" of mindfulness/awareness on the part of individuals is necessary.
Science + groundlessness = groovy.
Monday, November 26, 2007
Monday, November 19, 2007
Devices and the good life - Sally & Sabreena
a. substantivism ; autonomous power
b. instrumentalism ; neutral
c. pluralism ; many faceted
“The introduction of technology was done with the aim of liberating humanity for disease and toil, and of enriching art and athletics.” He argues that our world has come to have a more technological character because our attention is focused on what technology promises rather than social changes it has brought. Borgmann begins by analyzing the relations humans have with technological devices. Devices are entities that fulfill the technological promise of liberation and enrichment. He defines what he calls the "device paradigm”; Device paradigm: a pattern that is the dominate way in which we in the modern era have been taking up with the world.
“Availability – realized by “devices” – what a devise makes available what “commodity”.
The technological approach according to Borgmann consists in the on going replacement of the presents of things by availability of commodity delivered by devices. Technology according to Borgmann has developed into “a definite style of life”, which can be labeled as “consumption”. Consumptions deprive individuals of engagement. (Page 181) Liberal democracy and technology together shape the context in which human begins are invited to organize there existence according to the model provided by the device paradigm. Inequalities exist within social standings thus creating huge disparities in the realization between the rich and the poor.
Focal things promote what Borgmann calls “focal practices” by which he means focal things require engagement.
The social context for existence is shaped by liberal democracy, which defines “the good life” in terms of the consumption of mass manufactured products, which technology has made available in surplus.
On the bases of Ihd’s by his work a tripartite distinction can be made between types of human – artifact relations
- relations of mediation
- alterity relations
- background relations
Verbeek goes on to criticize Borgmann's analysis in several ways one in which Borgmann's definition of engagement shifts and from two different views to integrate into each other.Then concludes the chapter by discussing the post phenomenological perspective, which offers a rich and varied picture of technology.
Devices and the good life - Angela & Adam
Borgmann, in Verbeek's view has an improved approach to the analysis of technology's role, because he approaches it from the effects of specific technologies, rather than an abstract and monolithic view of "Technology". He defines what he calls the "device paradigm" - that is a shift from "things", which are inseparable from their context and which require high involvement or effort from humans, to "devices" which have low involvement, are not specifically involved in a certain context.
Devices have the property of providing 'availability' and what is provided then becomes a 'commodity'. People then consume the commodity, which provides the problem for Borgmann. Though technology improves life (i.e. enables "the good life") by making previously unavailable things available, it also promotes this passive, consumptive lifestyle, which prevents engagement with authentic existence, reminiscent of Jaspers. This is Borgmann's "irony of technology" - it promises enrichment but ends up impoverishing.
Technology is heavily implicated in socio-political structuring as well. Liberal democracy, which emphasizes freedom to persue personal realization, is enabled because technology frees people from their self-subsistance. The problem is that the device paradigm dictates that people must still consume, and their freedom is restricted to the manner of consumption, not a choice about whether or not to live the consumptive lifestyle. In addition, technology stabilizes the (class-related) status-quo by promising future enrichment to working and middle classes.
A potential alternative is present to Borgmann in the form of "focal practises" and "focal things". That is, activities which are persued for their own sake rather than as a means to an end, and the specific technologies that enable such. These focal practises enable people to engage with their reality.
Verbeek criticises Borgmann's analysis in several ways: first, there are examples of ways that technology enables engagement that would not otherwise be possible; second, Borgmann's definition of engagment shifts from effort or difficulty to meaningfulness, when the two shouldn't be equated.
Verbeek also points out that the way that technological objects are present to us is not as simple as Heidegger's and Borgmann's binary present-at-hand vs. readiness-to-hand, but since some objects display both properties, these should be seen as opposite ends of a spectrum.
The chapter concludes with a summary of the "postphenomenological vocabulary" that Verbeek is attempting to build - showing how technological objects mediate or translate our perception of the world as well as how we exist in it and interact with it. The picture is rather more complex than describing technology either as a totally autonomous and monolithic force, or as a totally neutral means.
Devices have the property of providing 'availability' and what is provided then becomes a 'commodity'. People then consume the commodity, which provides the problem for Borgmann. Though technology improves life (i.e. enables "the good life") by making previously unavailable things available, it also promotes this passive, consumptive lifestyle, which prevents engagement with authentic existence, reminiscent of Jaspers. This is Borgmann's "irony of technology" - it promises enrichment but ends up impoverishing.
Technology is heavily implicated in socio-political structuring as well. Liberal democracy, which emphasizes freedom to persue personal realization, is enabled because technology frees people from their self-subsistance. The problem is that the device paradigm dictates that people must still consume, and their freedom is restricted to the manner of consumption, not a choice about whether or not to live the consumptive lifestyle. In addition, technology stabilizes the (class-related) status-quo by promising future enrichment to working and middle classes.
A potential alternative is present to Borgmann in the form of "focal practises" and "focal things". That is, activities which are persued for their own sake rather than as a means to an end, and the specific technologies that enable such. These focal practises enable people to engage with their reality.
Verbeek criticises Borgmann's analysis in several ways: first, there are examples of ways that technology enables engagement that would not otherwise be possible; second, Borgmann's definition of engagment shifts from effort or difficulty to meaningfulness, when the two shouldn't be equated.
Verbeek also points out that the way that technological objects are present to us is not as simple as Heidegger's and Borgmann's binary present-at-hand vs. readiness-to-hand, but since some objects display both properties, these should be seen as opposite ends of a spectrum.
The chapter concludes with a summary of the "postphenomenological vocabulary" that Verbeek is attempting to build - showing how technological objects mediate or translate our perception of the world as well as how we exist in it and interact with it. The picture is rather more complex than describing technology either as a totally autonomous and monolithic force, or as a totally neutral means.
Sunday, November 18, 2007
Devices and the Good Life - Davide, Genevieve, Cho, Shih-En, and Amna
INTRODUCTION
- http://www.cas.umt.edu/phil/Faculty/Info%20Pages/borgmann.htm
Albert Borgmann is an American philosopher who was born in Freiburg, Germany in 1937.
The University of Montana, where he currently teaches as Regents Professor of Philosophy, contains a brief biographical list of his various works and reviews, as well as contact information.
- It is imperative to know that Borgmann was influenced by Heidegger.
***Heidegger & Borgmann Comparison***
*Both believe that technology plays a role in the human experience.
*Both exclusively examine the negative impact of this.
*Where they differ: Heidegger looked in technological possibilities whereas Borgmann uses concrete technological examples.
*Where they differ: Heidegger describes technology as a way of revealing (Gestell) while Borgmann describes technology as a way of shaping human existence.
For this reason, Borgmann's philosophy of technology can be seen as an extension to Heidegger's.
- Borgmann's work is the center piece of this chapter: Verbeek wishes to show how artifacts help to shape human existence with the aid of Borgmann's studies.
THE DEVICE PARADIGM
- Borgmann claims there are 3 approaches to technology:
(all quoted and found on p. 174)
*Substantivism views technology as an independent power that unfolds according to its own logic and holds society and culture firmly in its grasp.
*Instrumentalism is in many respects the opposite of substantivism, for it sees technology not as independent but as neutral, a mere means for the realization of human ends.
*Pluralism developed as a response to the shortcomings of both substantivism and instrumentalism. It sees technology as the outcomes of complex processes of evolution and interaction in which a play of myriad forces and influences determines which technologies ultimately arise and the forms that they take.
- Borgmann also claims there are problems with these approaches:
(critique on substantivism and instrumentalism on p. 174, critique on pluralism follows on p. 175)
*Substantivism doesn't bother to explain why technology is seen as developing autonomously.
*Instrumentalism assigns a bit role to technology, which makes the explanation unconvincing in Borgmann's eyes.
*Pluralism presents the development of technology in a manner more complex that it actually is. Thus, it is inadequate when attempting to be used as a response to the problems of substantivism and instrumentalism.
- Borgmann wishes to create a better response than pluralism to the tension between substantivism and instrumentalism. He calls his approach "paradigmatic," insofar as he understands technology in terms of paradigms.
- What is a paradigm?
- (Quote found on p. 175)
In Borgmann's view, technology contributes “a characteristic and constraining pattern to the entire fabric of our lives,” a “pattern” or “paradigm” that “inheres in the dominant way in which we in the modern era have been taking up with the world” which he calls the “device paradigm”. Borgmann’s entire philosophy of technology consists of an attempt to bring to light and understand this paradigm inhering in the way in which human beings engage the world.
- Borgmann uses concrete examples of technological devices (television sets, central heating plant, automobiles) to show the pattern/paradigm of modern technology.
- Borgmann believes that although "the pattern of technology is fundamental to the shape the world has assumed over the last three or so centuries, it has gone largely unnoticed." (bottom of p. 175 - 176)
This is because this paradigm came forth during the Age of Enlightenment.
Key points about the Enlightenment: 18th century, goverment stability, nation creation, common people obtaining greater power, nobility/church begin losing power.
As is evident, there were many contributig factors to the idealistic lifestyle of this era, with technology being among them. However, due to technology's "promising character", as Verbeek calls it, it was able to both enhance and hide its transformative power.
- This promise is a key point that was formulated by Bacon and Descartes. They deduced that technology was brought forth with the goal of "liberating humanity from disease, hunger, and toil, and of enriching life with learning, art, and athletics." (p. 176)
Technology was thus originally meant to improve and ease the living conditions of human beings. Verbeek, though, notes that the promise is vague; for example, there is no mention to what degree technology seeks to liberate humanity from its woes or to what extent it seeks to enrich our lives. This means technology's promise could be fulfilled a in a very small, unnoticeable
way.
On the other hand, it is due to the promise's lack of details that technology has been able to continuously grow even further. Technology's promise may bring forth small results, but it is also capable of producing enormous, world-changing possibilities. This limitless potential, though, has had the side effect of turning the attention away from the social changes it is capable of yielding. Ergo, the technological pattern Borgmann describes has not come to light just yet and this has resulted in a new "character of contemporary life."
DEVICES AND THINGS
- Borgmann describes the "technological pattern" in modern life. He begins by analyzing the relation humans have with technological devices.
- Key terms used:
Device: entity that fulfills the technological promise of liberation (from needs and burdens) and enrichment (making things more accessible).
Thing: pretechnological version of a device. Dealing with one forces us to be involved extensively in its world. It cannot be removed from its context.
Availability: a commodity that has been rendered instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe, and easy.
Commodity: that which a device makes available.
These four terms describe how a relation between a human and a technological device can produce results: A device makes a commodity available.
- Borgmann analyzes warmth and its availability in an example of how this relationship works:
(paraphrasing example from p. 176)
Warmth. In the old days, warmth was delivered to houses by a fire that burned in the stove or fireplace – it was not “available”. It was not instantaneous (too much work), was not ubiquitous (not all rooms could be warmed in this manner), not safe (you could be hurt chopping or burning the wood and houses could catch fire), and was not easy (work, skill, and attention were always needed). Technologies have made warmth available today; turning up the dial of a thermostat on a central heating system make it so.
Device: Central heating system.
Device availability: Yes.
Thing: Fireplace.
Thing availability: No.
Commodity: Warmth.
- According to Borgmann, devices are capable of delivering a commodity so efficiently due their machinery, which makes up the "background of technology". Although it is not in the limelight often, it makes it possible for a device to function without the need to understand the exact details. Were it necessary to understand every minute detail, the device would cease to be available due to its complexity; this would reduce it to the status of a thing.
(Example found at the top of p. 178)
The ability to tell time from a watch is not dependent on what powers it. The only thing a human needs to understand is that the device is a watch and the commodity it provides is the ability to tell time. Meanwhile, the battery or spring which is powering said watch works in the background and should only become a concern when there comes a time to replace it.
- "The technological pattern consists in the ongoing replacement of the presence of things by the availability of commodities delivered by devices". (p. 178)
As a thing cannot be removed from its context and requires the utmost attention, machinery is given its task and is hidden in the background. This allows us to obtain and enjoy commodities with relative ease. In this way, the device paradigm divides things into commodities and machinery.
- Borgmann believes that devices are not the technological innovations that they appear to be: going by his previous definitions and terms, he believes they promote the consumption of commodities (constant taking) without a form of engagement (ignorance or lack of knowledge of machinery). This is the device paradigm, or pattern, that is mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
- Borgmann quickly concludes that only nontechnological things have the ability to engage human beings and that technological artifacts only invite disengaged consumption. Verbeek believes that devices can indeed promote engagement.
- http://www.cas.umt.edu/phil/Faculty/Info%20Pages/borgmann.htm
Albert Borgmann is an American philosopher who was born in Freiburg, Germany in 1937.
The University of Montana, where he currently teaches as Regents Professor of Philosophy, contains a brief biographical list of his various works and reviews, as well as contact information.
- It is imperative to know that Borgmann was influenced by Heidegger.
***Heidegger & Borgmann Comparison***
*Both believe that technology plays a role in the human experience.
*Both exclusively examine the negative impact of this.
*Where they differ: Heidegger looked in technological possibilities whereas Borgmann uses concrete technological examples.
*Where they differ: Heidegger describes technology as a way of revealing (Gestell) while Borgmann describes technology as a way of shaping human existence.
For this reason, Borgmann's philosophy of technology can be seen as an extension to Heidegger's.
- Borgmann's work is the center piece of this chapter: Verbeek wishes to show how artifacts help to shape human existence with the aid of Borgmann's studies.
THE DEVICE PARADIGM
- Borgmann claims there are 3 approaches to technology:
(all quoted and found on p. 174)
*Substantivism views technology as an independent power that unfolds according to its own logic and holds society and culture firmly in its grasp.
*Instrumentalism is in many respects the opposite of substantivism, for it sees technology not as independent but as neutral, a mere means for the realization of human ends.
*Pluralism developed as a response to the shortcomings of both substantivism and instrumentalism. It sees technology as the outcomes of complex processes of evolution and interaction in which a play of myriad forces and influences determines which technologies ultimately arise and the forms that they take.
- Borgmann also claims there are problems with these approaches:
(critique on substantivism and instrumentalism on p. 174, critique on pluralism follows on p. 175)
*Substantivism doesn't bother to explain why technology is seen as developing autonomously.
*Instrumentalism assigns a bit role to technology, which makes the explanation unconvincing in Borgmann's eyes.
*Pluralism presents the development of technology in a manner more complex that it actually is. Thus, it is inadequate when attempting to be used as a response to the problems of substantivism and instrumentalism.
- Borgmann wishes to create a better response than pluralism to the tension between substantivism and instrumentalism. He calls his approach "paradigmatic," insofar as he understands technology in terms of paradigms.
- What is a paradigm?
- (Quote found on p. 175)
In Borgmann's view, technology contributes “a characteristic and constraining pattern to the entire fabric of our lives,” a “pattern” or “paradigm” that “inheres in the dominant way in which we in the modern era have been taking up with the world” which he calls the “device paradigm”. Borgmann’s entire philosophy of technology consists of an attempt to bring to light and understand this paradigm inhering in the way in which human beings engage the world.
- Borgmann uses concrete examples of technological devices (television sets, central heating plant, automobiles) to show the pattern/paradigm of modern technology.
- Borgmann believes that although "the pattern of technology is fundamental to the shape the world has assumed over the last three or so centuries, it has gone largely unnoticed." (bottom of p. 175 - 176)
This is because this paradigm came forth during the Age of Enlightenment.
Key points about the Enlightenment: 18th century, goverment stability, nation creation, common people obtaining greater power, nobility/church begin losing power.
As is evident, there were many contributig factors to the idealistic lifestyle of this era, with technology being among them. However, due to technology's "promising character", as Verbeek calls it, it was able to both enhance and hide its transformative power.
- This promise is a key point that was formulated by Bacon and Descartes. They deduced that technology was brought forth with the goal of "liberating humanity from disease, hunger, and toil, and of enriching life with learning, art, and athletics." (p. 176)
Technology was thus originally meant to improve and ease the living conditions of human beings. Verbeek, though, notes that the promise is vague; for example, there is no mention to what degree technology seeks to liberate humanity from its woes or to what extent it seeks to enrich our lives. This means technology's promise could be fulfilled a in a very small, unnoticeable
way.
On the other hand, it is due to the promise's lack of details that technology has been able to continuously grow even further. Technology's promise may bring forth small results, but it is also capable of producing enormous, world-changing possibilities. This limitless potential, though, has had the side effect of turning the attention away from the social changes it is capable of yielding. Ergo, the technological pattern Borgmann describes has not come to light just yet and this has resulted in a new "character of contemporary life."
DEVICES AND THINGS
- Borgmann describes the "technological pattern" in modern life. He begins by analyzing the relation humans have with technological devices.
- Key terms used:
Device: entity that fulfills the technological promise of liberation (from needs and burdens) and enrichment (making things more accessible).
Thing: pretechnological version of a device. Dealing with one forces us to be involved extensively in its world. It cannot be removed from its context.
Availability: a commodity that has been rendered instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe, and easy.
Commodity: that which a device makes available.
These four terms describe how a relation between a human and a technological device can produce results: A device makes a commodity available.
- Borgmann analyzes warmth and its availability in an example of how this relationship works:
(paraphrasing example from p. 176)
Warmth. In the old days, warmth was delivered to houses by a fire that burned in the stove or fireplace – it was not “available”. It was not instantaneous (too much work), was not ubiquitous (not all rooms could be warmed in this manner), not safe (you could be hurt chopping or burning the wood and houses could catch fire), and was not easy (work, skill, and attention were always needed). Technologies have made warmth available today; turning up the dial of a thermostat on a central heating system make it so.
Device: Central heating system.
Device availability: Yes.
Thing: Fireplace.
Thing availability: No.
Commodity: Warmth.
- According to Borgmann, devices are capable of delivering a commodity so efficiently due their machinery, which makes up the "background of technology". Although it is not in the limelight often, it makes it possible for a device to function without the need to understand the exact details. Were it necessary to understand every minute detail, the device would cease to be available due to its complexity; this would reduce it to the status of a thing.
(Example found at the top of p. 178)
The ability to tell time from a watch is not dependent on what powers it. The only thing a human needs to understand is that the device is a watch and the commodity it provides is the ability to tell time. Meanwhile, the battery or spring which is powering said watch works in the background and should only become a concern when there comes a time to replace it.
- "The technological pattern consists in the ongoing replacement of the presence of things by the availability of commodities delivered by devices". (p. 178)
As a thing cannot be removed from its context and requires the utmost attention, machinery is given its task and is hidden in the background. This allows us to obtain and enjoy commodities with relative ease. In this way, the device paradigm divides things into commodities and machinery.
- Borgmann believes that devices are not the technological innovations that they appear to be: going by his previous definitions and terms, he believes they promote the consumption of commodities (constant taking) without a form of engagement (ignorance or lack of knowledge of machinery). This is the device paradigm, or pattern, that is mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
- Borgmann quickly concludes that only nontechnological things have the ability to engage human beings and that technological artifacts only invite disengaged consumption. Verbeek believes that devices can indeed promote engagement.
TECHNOLOGY AND THE GOOD LIFE
Borgmann talks about technology and how it has changed the way we interact with the world today.
Technology according to Borgmann has developed, ‘a definite style of life’, which can be
labeled as consumption. (p178)
He says that technology promised to bring fulfillment and enlightenment to the world through commodities. But it is now difficult to see how the consumptive relation to commodities contributes to a meaningful human existence.
Technology has shaped our way of life in such a way or a ‘pattern’ that it now stands in our background to structure the way in which we human being deals with the world.
The replacement of things by device and of engagement with consumption has decreased our engagement with the world to a lesser degree. (p179)
Borgmann states the existence of consumptive behavior by giving example of the couch-potato, a person who spends hours and hours each day watching television. This make him deprived from social interaction as well as from reading a book or going out and having a walk with the dog.
He says that it’s such a paradox to see how technology that promised to provide enrichment provides impoverishment.
Borgmann says that initially technology did protect us with hunger, cold, disease, darkness etc but could some of the modern day technologies come under these characterization of saving or protecting us. He gives example of microwave food, where one has to stand for 20 minutes to get a frozen dinner ready.
Though technologic advancement in the past have saved and have liberated human beings from misery, the new technological innovations nowadays only severe to eliminate our interaction with the world.(p.180)
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE GOOD LIFE
Borgmann says it is only the devices that shape the human context but also the way in which they are organized.
He says that liberal democracy and technology together shape the context in which human beings are invited to organize their existence.
Liberal democrative vision of a society gives rise to the idea of freedom, liberty and choice. The same message is given through the power of technology.
An idea of a free and liberated world where everything is made easy for one‘s convinces.
By creating availability human beings can both choose their own means for realizing themselves and make free choices from the available consumable goods.
As Borgmann says “liberal Democracy is enacted as technology” (p.181)
Belief in the promise that technology is the path to deliverance from want and provision of human enrichment by generating availability provides a kind of social and political stability. (p.183)
FOCAL THINGS AND PRACTICES
Borgmann talk about the focal things and focal practices in today’s world.
To him things and commodities can never be equal. One always has to replace the other.
Focal things are the one that invite engagement and draw together human interaction. They result in focal practices, by means of dealing with the world. (p184)
Borgmann’s point of view can be explained by the example of today’s heating system and the traditional fireplace.
In early days homes were kept warm through lighting up fire in the fireplace. The procedure to lit the fire took up involvement of all the people in the house as well as interaction with outside world.
The process started from cutting up the wood to bringing them in the house and then lighting it up in the fireplace. According to Borgmann the fireplace is a ‘thing’, a focal thing.
The fireplace not only brought warmth but also made ones interaction with the rest of the
world. This created a sense of satisfaction and fulfillment which gave rise to a focal practice.
Where as in today’s world, with the invention of the new technology the old fireplaces are replaced by the modern heating systems. Borgmann calls these devices as mere ‘commodities’. By using these devices our interaction with the world and with the people around us, has diminished and is not equal to the interaction and satisfaction that one got through the fireplace.
Borgmann is not calling for us to retreat to prtechnological patterns, but rather to keep technology more at bay, more at periphery of our lives.(p.185)
Saturday, November 17, 2007
Devices and the Good Life (Continued) - Davide, Genevieve, Cho, Shih-En, and Amna
BEYOND ALIENATION
Borgmann’s concepts enable the existential dimension of technological mediation to be fleshed out further, but a few critical remarks should be borne in mind. His diagnosis comes dangerously close to the alienation of Heidegger. (p. 185)
The power of Borgmann’s analysis consists in his approach of technology in terms of specific artifacts rather than reducing it to its conditions of possibility, as did the classical philosophy of technology.
The pattern that he perceives as organizing our existence is not something a priori of which technology is the concrete realization. Also, the particular content of this pattern – that the involvements that human beings have with the world are diminishing more and more due to devices – is questionable.
Borgmann claims that technology leads to an impoverished, consumptive existence. But Verbeek argues with the following (p. 186):
· Borgmann’s concept of impoverishment of modern life becomes ambiguous as he develops his opinion.
· Verbeek says that the exclusive alternative Borgmann offers between engagement with non-technological things and disengaged consumption of technological devices is untenable. The pattern that he outlines does not do justice to the role of technology in human existence, however enlightening it is to describe it in terms of involvements.
Two Forms of Engagement
· Engagement through focal practices without any specific goals.
Also, Verbeek says the problem lies not in Borgmann’s concept of relevance or importance of practices that give meaningfulness. The problem lies in Borgmann’s ambiguity in his concept of engagement (p. 187).
He eventually merges the two following statements:
· Technology diminishes the possibilities of experiencing meaning and leading an engaged life.
· Technology diminishes the efforts that people have to expend.
On the basis of Borgmann’s theory via the device paradigm, technology primarily leads to a reduction of effort and only in an indirect way threatens focal engagement. But a device can never be a true alternative to a focal practice because such a practice is never straightforwardly aimed at the realization of an end for which technology could provide a more efficient means (i.e. running a marathon is not for transportation purposes, nor is preparing a large festive meal to satisfy hunger) (p. 188).
If people give up focal practices, they do not do this because they use technological devices, but because they are entirely submerged in the consumptive attitude that the use of devices invites.
Engaging Devices
Technologies generally diminish the amount of effort that is required to obtain goods, but their role in “focal engagement” is more ambivalent.
In some cases technologies even enhance engagement in the sense of effort; however, in the case of the microwave, it has invited a more complex cooking process. And in the case of faster means of transportation, the commuting time has lengthened the distance over which people commute.
Technology can not only reduce engagement but also amplify it. It gives rise not only to disengaged consumption, but also to new possibilities. Consumption can even be better understood by making use of products in which the amplification and reduction of engagement are entwined together in an ambivalent way (p. 190).
Borgmann only acknowledges a single aspect of the implications of technology: disengagement. Technology indeed makes things available, but the lack of human involvement in the process does not mean that humans are not involved in the product.
On the existential and hermeneutical level, technologies can be seen to play an ambivalent role in shaping the human-world relation. Borgmann’s device paradigm only reveals a small portion of the role that technologies play in human existence. Involvement, in the form both of effort and meaning-giving engagement, needs to be treated as a dimension of technological mediation and not as something that technology excludes or renders impossible (p. 191).
MEDIATED ENGAGEMENT
The goal is to translate Borgmann’s analysis to a postphenomenological perspective.
Borgmann’s analyze how human engage with reality in which many actions are mediated by technologies. Therefore, it allows Verbeek to analyze how technology affects how human existence takes shape (p.191).
Devices and Involvement
Technological artifacts mediate perception by excluding certain kinds of actions and promoting others (p.191).
Example: CD player inhibits making music but promotes listening to music.
Also true with patterns of mass consumption created by “the good life” by changing human engagement.
Also true with the environment of the artifacts by changing the activities.
Example: no more need to cut the wood, but use a power mower for cutting the borders of the lawn (p.192).
Analyzing the technological mediation of involvement (effort and engagement).
Three variants of involvement: can concern the artifact (i.e. playing the piano, its environment i.e. gathering and chopping wood for the fireplace, or the product that the artifact makes available i.e. enjoying music with a CD player (p. 192).
Ambivalence of technological mediation is more evident in the third kind of involvement (the product that the artifact makes available) that Borgmann’s describes as “commodities” (p.193).
Involvement and Human-Artifact Relations
Human experience is transformed in the technological mediation of perception and of cultural frameworks of interpretation (chp. 4).
Human existence is translated by the technological mediation of human action and its social context (p.193).
Three types of human-artifact relation, based on Ihde’s work: relation of mediation (human-technology-world), alterity relations (human-technology/world), and background relations (human/technology-world).
These can be further divide between embodiment relation and hermeneutical relation.
However only embodiment relations are relevant in the analysis of the mediation of action. (p.193).
Embodiment relations are the way in which artifacts present in the relations as “readiness-to-hand”.
There is two ways that an artifact can be ready-to-hand: engaged (i.e. does call attention to itself or a disengaged i.e. disappear in the background).
Example: Music with the piano (engage) and the CD player (disengage).
At the same time the piano is neither exclusively ready-to-hand nor present-at-end (i.e. machinery not completely in the background or in the foreground).
Therefore ready-to-hand and present-at-end are the two end point of a line that the artifacts can be position themselves on (p.194).
There is a multiplicity of ways in witch artifacts mediate human-world relations. Involvement can be an “effort” or a “focal engagement”.
Involvement can be with the device itself, its environment, or with the products that makes it available (p.195).
CONCLUSION: THE MEDIATION OF ACTION AND EXPERIENCE
Verbeek has tried to create a critical review of the positions of Ihde, Latour, and Borgmann, to develop a postphenomenological vocabulary for analyzing the mediating role of artifacts. The structure of this kind of mediation involves amplification and reduction; some interpretive possibilities are strengthened while others are discouraged. This kind of mediation can be described in terms of translation, whose structure involves invitation and inhibition some forms of involvement are fostered while others are discouraged (p. 195).
The most important post-phenomenological concepts can be seen on p. 196 of What Things Do.
The post-phenomenological perspective offers a completely different view of technology than the classical philosophy of technology. In contrast to the latter’s fear that technology alienates us from reality and from our authentic existential possibilities, the post-phenomenological perspective offers a rich picture of technology, which does justice to its ambivalent status (p. 196).
While the classical post-phenomenology speaks of technology as involving a loss of meaning, post-phenomenology speaks of transformation of the ways in which reality can be present for humans; post-phenomenology speaks of translation of the ways in which human beings can be present in the world and realize their existence (p. 197).
The value of this postphenomenological makes possible a more careful and thorough investigation of specific technologies. The concluding example for Verbeek is the PDA: it has the ability to reduce the pressure of work, but also can rob people of relaxation.
· During a train ride, it can mediate its user’s pressure from “reading”, “looking at landscape” to “working on one’s text”. It involves both effort and focal engagement: towards its intrinsic value and its original functionality.
· When one writes with a PDA, one embodies and these embodiment relations changes into alterity relations (p. 198).
· The dimensions of action and perception, with the associated reductions and amplifications of interpretations and involvements, are also present (i.e. via PDA emailing). The PDA can mediate one’s entire world. It mediates the relation between humans and world, and thus coshapes their experience and existence (p. 199).
Borgmann’s concepts enable the existential dimension of technological mediation to be fleshed out further, but a few critical remarks should be borne in mind. His diagnosis comes dangerously close to the alienation of Heidegger. (p. 185)
The power of Borgmann’s analysis consists in his approach of technology in terms of specific artifacts rather than reducing it to its conditions of possibility, as did the classical philosophy of technology.
The pattern that he perceives as organizing our existence is not something a priori of which technology is the concrete realization. Also, the particular content of this pattern – that the involvements that human beings have with the world are diminishing more and more due to devices – is questionable.
Borgmann claims that technology leads to an impoverished, consumptive existence. But Verbeek argues with the following (p. 186):
· Borgmann’s concept of impoverishment of modern life becomes ambiguous as he develops his opinion.
· Verbeek says that the exclusive alternative Borgmann offers between engagement with non-technological things and disengaged consumption of technological devices is untenable. The pattern that he outlines does not do justice to the role of technology in human existence, however enlightening it is to describe it in terms of involvements.
Two Forms of Engagement
Borgmann claims that devices diminish the engagement of human beings with their environment and invite consumption. The engagement that is thereby lost, according to Borgmann, can be recovered if people devote themselves to focal things and practices.
The engagement of focal things is not described in terms of effort and exertion, but of meaningfulness. Borgmann speaks about focal things and practices in terms of “orienting one’s life” and “realizing one’s aspirations” (p. 187).
But when the engagement that technology causes to be lost is compared with the engagement brought by focal practices, a striking difference emerges between these two kinds of engagement.
There is a distinction between practices that require effort and those that produce meaningfulness, and these are two different kinds of engagement. They can be separated as the following:
· Engagement through focal practices without any specific goals.
Also, Verbeek says the problem lies not in Borgmann’s concept of relevance or importance of practices that give meaningfulness. The problem lies in Borgmann’s ambiguity in his concept of engagement (p. 187).
He eventually merges the two following statements:
· Technology diminishes the possibilities of experiencing meaning and leading an engaged life.
· Technology diminishes the efforts that people have to expend.
On the basis of Borgmann’s theory via the device paradigm, technology primarily leads to a reduction of effort and only in an indirect way threatens focal engagement. But a device can never be a true alternative to a focal practice because such a practice is never straightforwardly aimed at the realization of an end for which technology could provide a more efficient means (i.e. running a marathon is not for transportation purposes, nor is preparing a large festive meal to satisfy hunger) (p. 188).
If people give up focal practices, they do not do this because they use technological devices, but because they are entirely submerged in the consumptive attitude that the use of devices invites.
Engaging Devices
Technologies generally diminish the amount of effort that is required to obtain goods, but their role in “focal engagement” is more ambivalent.
In some cases technologies even enhance engagement in the sense of effort; however, in the case of the microwave, it has invited a more complex cooking process. And in the case of faster means of transportation, the commuting time has lengthened the distance over which people commute.
Technology can not only reduce engagement but also amplify it. It gives rise not only to disengaged consumption, but also to new possibilities. Consumption can even be better understood by making use of products in which the amplification and reduction of engagement are entwined together in an ambivalent way (p. 190).
Borgmann only acknowledges a single aspect of the implications of technology: disengagement. Technology indeed makes things available, but the lack of human involvement in the process does not mean that humans are not involved in the product.
On the existential and hermeneutical level, technologies can be seen to play an ambivalent role in shaping the human-world relation. Borgmann’s device paradigm only reveals a small portion of the role that technologies play in human existence. Involvement, in the form both of effort and meaning-giving engagement, needs to be treated as a dimension of technological mediation and not as something that technology excludes or renders impossible (p. 191).
MEDIATED ENGAGEMENT
The goal is to translate Borgmann’s analysis to a postphenomenological perspective.
Borgmann’s analyze how human engage with reality in which many actions are mediated by technologies. Therefore, it allows Verbeek to analyze how technology affects how human existence takes shape (p.191).
Devices and Involvement
Technological artifacts mediate perception by excluding certain kinds of actions and promoting others (p.191).
Example: CD player inhibits making music but promotes listening to music.
Also true with patterns of mass consumption created by “the good life” by changing human engagement.
Also true with the environment of the artifacts by changing the activities.
Example: no more need to cut the wood, but use a power mower for cutting the borders of the lawn (p.192).
Analyzing the technological mediation of involvement (effort and engagement).
Three variants of involvement: can concern the artifact (i.e. playing the piano, its environment i.e. gathering and chopping wood for the fireplace, or the product that the artifact makes available i.e. enjoying music with a CD player (p. 192).
Ambivalence of technological mediation is more evident in the third kind of involvement (the product that the artifact makes available) that Borgmann’s describes as “commodities” (p.193).
Involvement and Human-Artifact Relations
Human experience is transformed in the technological mediation of perception and of cultural frameworks of interpretation (chp. 4).
Human existence is translated by the technological mediation of human action and its social context (p.193).
Three types of human-artifact relation, based on Ihde’s work: relation of mediation (human-technology-world), alterity relations (human-technology/world), and background relations (human/technology-world).
These can be further divide between embodiment relation and hermeneutical relation.
However only embodiment relations are relevant in the analysis of the mediation of action. (p.193).
Embodiment relations are the way in which artifacts present in the relations as “readiness-to-hand”.
There is two ways that an artifact can be ready-to-hand: engaged (i.e. does call attention to itself or a disengaged i.e. disappear in the background).
Example: Music with the piano (engage) and the CD player (disengage).
At the same time the piano is neither exclusively ready-to-hand nor present-at-end (i.e. machinery not completely in the background or in the foreground).
Therefore ready-to-hand and present-at-end are the two end point of a line that the artifacts can be position themselves on (p.194).
There is a multiplicity of ways in witch artifacts mediate human-world relations. Involvement can be an “effort” or a “focal engagement”.
Involvement can be with the device itself, its environment, or with the products that makes it available (p.195).
CONCLUSION: THE MEDIATION OF ACTION AND EXPERIENCE
Verbeek has tried to create a critical review of the positions of Ihde, Latour, and Borgmann, to develop a postphenomenological vocabulary for analyzing the mediating role of artifacts. The structure of this kind of mediation involves amplification and reduction; some interpretive possibilities are strengthened while others are discouraged. This kind of mediation can be described in terms of translation, whose structure involves invitation and inhibition some forms of involvement are fostered while others are discouraged (p. 195).
The most important post-phenomenological concepts can be seen on p. 196 of What Things Do.
The post-phenomenological perspective offers a completely different view of technology than the classical philosophy of technology. In contrast to the latter’s fear that technology alienates us from reality and from our authentic existential possibilities, the post-phenomenological perspective offers a rich picture of technology, which does justice to its ambivalent status (p. 196).
While the classical post-phenomenology speaks of technology as involving a loss of meaning, post-phenomenology speaks of transformation of the ways in which reality can be present for humans; post-phenomenology speaks of translation of the ways in which human beings can be present in the world and realize their existence (p. 197).
The value of this postphenomenological makes possible a more careful and thorough investigation of specific technologies. The concluding example for Verbeek is the PDA: it has the ability to reduce the pressure of work, but also can rob people of relaxation.
· During a train ride, it can mediate its user’s pressure from “reading”, “looking at landscape” to “working on one’s text”. It involves both effort and focal engagement: towards its intrinsic value and its original functionality.
· When one writes with a PDA, one embodies and these embodiment relations changes into alterity relations (p. 198).
· The dimensions of action and perception, with the associated reductions and amplifications of interpretations and involvements, are also present (i.e. via PDA emailing). The PDA can mediate one’s entire world. It mediates the relation between humans and world, and thus coshapes their experience and existence (p. 199).
Monday, November 12, 2007
Latour - Angela and Adam
Latour is trying to get away from the duality between object and subject prevalent in Western philosophy and science. He describes the concepts 'human' and 'non-human' and envisions 'technique' as the socialization of the non-human. He sees the traditional relationship between society and technology as a tautology and instead develops a 'genealogy' of sociotechnological development as a swapping of properties between humans and non-humans.
This involves many dependent layers, leading from 'social complexity' - that is, prehumans manipulating each other to survive - to 'political ecology' - in which nonhumans are given full social relations and therefore rights. Each layer is either human or non-human, and each layer also confers human or non-human properties onto the other group. For example, 'internalized ecology' is the stage where domestication and agriculture have occured due to relevant plants/animals and materials (non-human) being fully socialized, or internalized by the the 'society' (human) of the previous layer.
"Latour's universe consists of actors that stand in relation to each other and interact via networks" (p 149). Actors are not to be understood as only human, but any entity that exists in relation with others in a network. Similarly, entities do not 'enter into' relationships with each other, but are defined by them (car example). For Latour, this emergent concept of an 'existance' is more important than a predefined 'essance'. Essence is constructed by the networks of existances.
Latour defines four modes of technical mediation: Translation, in which a program of action (of a human) is transformed or translated by the program of action of another entity (gun example); Composition, in which the responsibility for action is not due to one entity, human or not, but is spread over the network in which that entity exists (hotel key example); Reversible black boxing, where the network blending human and non-human is quite often normally invisible, but that invisibility breaks down when the normal function of technical entities is interrupted (projector example); Delegation and Scripts, where the program of action of an entity is delegated or enscribed into another entity (speedbump example).
(Also, issues of postphenomenology! Asking different questions leads to different answers! We were never modern!)
This involves many dependent layers, leading from 'social complexity' - that is, prehumans manipulating each other to survive - to 'political ecology' - in which nonhumans are given full social relations and therefore rights. Each layer is either human or non-human, and each layer also confers human or non-human properties onto the other group. For example, 'internalized ecology' is the stage where domestication and agriculture have occured due to relevant plants/animals and materials (non-human) being fully socialized, or internalized by the the 'society' (human) of the previous layer.
"Latour's universe consists of actors that stand in relation to each other and interact via networks" (p 149). Actors are not to be understood as only human, but any entity that exists in relation with others in a network. Similarly, entities do not 'enter into' relationships with each other, but are defined by them (car example). For Latour, this emergent concept of an 'existance' is more important than a predefined 'essance'. Essence is constructed by the networks of existances.
Latour defines four modes of technical mediation: Translation, in which a program of action (of a human) is transformed or translated by the program of action of another entity (gun example); Composition, in which the responsibility for action is not due to one entity, human or not, but is spread over the network in which that entity exists (hotel key example); Reversible black boxing, where the network blending human and non-human is quite often normally invisible, but that invisibility breaks down when the normal function of technical entities is interrupted (projector example); Delegation and Scripts, where the program of action of an entity is delegated or enscribed into another entity (speedbump example).
(Also, issues of postphenomenology! Asking different questions leads to different answers! We were never modern!)
Acts of Artifacts (Continued) Davide, Genevieve, Cho, Shih-En, and Amna
As Verbeek points out, Latour uses the previous observations to say that the relation between humans and the world in the post-phenomenological view is complementary to the classical hermeneutic view. He does not believe in phenomenology being able to describe the world through words since descriptions themselves are mediated only through a set of words. Though it does not seek to explain empirical reality, Latour’s view does show how human lives can be technologically mediated as well. Phenomenology may be rejected by Latour, but actor-network theory itself is not primarily about the dichotomy of the subject-object, but rather, it is about the emergence of relations between networks. It looks for chains of associations.
However, as sound as they may seem, Latour’s theories should probably not be taken universally. For example, the aforementioned chains are a bit more differentiated than Latour’s post-phenomenological view; according to Verbeek, they should be separated into categories such as presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand. Another Latourian concept that might be problematic according to Verbeek is delegation since it creates an asymmetry between humans and non-humans, something that is against his main idea of mutual relationships. Rather than being a social constructivist, Latour is simply a constructivist who tries to escape the subject-object dichotomy because of the constant rise of new entities, hybrids that simply cannot be defined under this category. Ironically, as noted previously, it is exactly because they cannot be concretely categorized that they thrive. Perhaps we not only need to analyze our technological culture similarly to how anthropologists study other cultures, as well as through Latour's four meanings of mediation, but also by incorporating other ideas that might fit into a more empirical reality.
However, as sound as they may seem, Latour’s theories should probably not be taken universally. For example, the aforementioned chains are a bit more differentiated than Latour’s post-phenomenological view; according to Verbeek, they should be separated into categories such as presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand. Another Latourian concept that might be problematic according to Verbeek is delegation since it creates an asymmetry between humans and non-humans, something that is against his main idea of mutual relationships. Rather than being a social constructivist, Latour is simply a constructivist who tries to escape the subject-object dichotomy because of the constant rise of new entities, hybrids that simply cannot be defined under this category. Ironically, as noted previously, it is exactly because they cannot be concretely categorized that they thrive. Perhaps we not only need to analyze our technological culture similarly to how anthropologists study other cultures, as well as through Latour's four meanings of mediation, but also by incorporating other ideas that might fit into a more empirical reality.
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